In their report released on 30th January 1998, the
independent audit consultants SMEC Australia state that there are
serious flaws in the Draft EIS process for the Second Sydney
Airport.
The audit report was available at Australian EIA
Notification Site
http://www.environment.gov.au/portfolio/epg/eianet/notifications/GI1.html
as HTML or PDF but link broke in 2002. A summary is below.
SMEC were retained by the Minister for Environment as a watchdog
over the performance of the EIS consultants, PPK. This was to meet
promises to abide by recommendations of the Senate Select Committee
report "Falling on Deaf Ears". The Senate Committee investigated
the debacle over the Third Runway expansion at KSA, and having the
process audited was a key recommendation.
The Draft EIS was released for public comment on 22nd
December, 1997. While the public was told persistently that there
would be no delay in release of the audit report, it did not appear
for another month. Too hot to handle
?
SMEC's criticisms included:
The Federal Government had failed to define a
role for Sydney's Second Airport.
Time and costs constraints imposed by the Dept of
Transport on its EIS consultants, the firm PPK.
BEAR Comment: It's a clever tactic to pretend to do an EIS, but
set such unrealistic deadlines that it can't be done properly. This
table shows how things were at the start of the Second Airport
EIS.
3rd Runway at
KSA |
SSA -Badgerys
Creek/Holsworthy |
Ratio (SSA/
KSA) |
Summary |
cost over $9 million for EIS
study |
budgeted $1.8 m for EIS |
1:5 |
|
2 years to complete to the Draft EIS
stage |
6 + 2 months to complete to Draft
EIS |
1:3 |
Much less resourcing (improved from 1:4 now) |
1 runway |
6 runways per site |
12:1 |
|
1 site, already an airport |
two green field sites |
2:1 |
Much more work |
In the end, it took some 18 months to get to the revised Draft
EIS on the Badgerys Creek proposals alone, with its 6 runways in
three options. Still well short of the resourcing for the poorly
done Third Runway. No wonder there are serious flaws.
The environmental
consequences of doing nothing, especially regarding the impacts on
Sydney Airport was not addressed
BEAR: This omission will leave the government free to proceed to
do nothing, at least until the next election, if not for
longer.
As it turned out, by mid-2003 the Government
was firmly committed to the thoroughly unevaluated do-nothing
option.
The auditor's complaints about failure to evaluate this,
ironically, had Fallen on Deaf Ears.
There is no identification of how the existing
airport and the new one would operate together to minimize the
impact of aircraft noise in Sydney
The draft EIS presents its results on airport
hazard and risk analysis in a way that implies a higher level of
accuracy than is warranted
The economic analysis was
inadequate and not of a standard required for this type of
project
BEAR: Is this a polite way of telling us the numbers are being
cooked up fraudulently ? See AFFORDABILITY OF SECOND AIRPORT for another angle on
project economics.
Work on airport noise, air quality and health
impacts was broadly acceptable, but a number of areas requiring
more work or better information were identified.
PPK's community consultation work had failed to
build confidence in the EIS process.
Other Audit Deficiencies
While the Government might claim that it fulfilled its election
promises by appointment of the auditor, the evidence doesn't stack
up. RUST-PPK studies proceeded for nearly 6 months prior to the
appointment of a parallel independent environmental auditor.
Although the Minister for the Environment announced that he'd
appointed the auditor in November 1996, a contract was not signed
with SMEC until over 4 months later.
This was a clear breach of election
and later promises.
The Senate Select Committee on Aircraft Noise in Sydney
recommended
a 'parallel environmental audit procedure should be
available during the preparation by the proponent of an EIS for a
significant proposal, with the auditor having access to the same
data as the proponent
-Falling on Deaf Ears, Executive Summary, page
E5 &63, Nov 1995,
The Liberal Party Policy on a Second Major
Airport for Sydney in February 1996 stated that
The coalition will ensure that the new EIS on the project will
be conducted in accordance with the guidelines set out by the
Senate Select Committee on Aircraft Noise in Sydney.
There will be extensive consultation with residents, councils
and community groups.
A parallel, and independent, environmental audit procedure will
be available during the EIS process with the auditor having access
to the same data as the proponent.
(source,"Putting People First - The Coalition's
Policy on Sydney Airport and Sydney West Airport", from Dept Of
Transport, Internet Web Page http://www.dot.gov.au/aircraft.htm, as
at 11/7/96 - now gone missing, but still available at
http://www.liberal.org.au/POLICY/AIR/aircraft.htm, as at 22/10/96 -
emphasis added by me)
The purpose behind the Senate Committee recommendation is to
ensure objectivity and to address concerns that the process might
be manipulated to achieve a pre-determined result. The Head of the
EPA promised an independent auditor would be appointed at the
Meetings for the Draft EIS guidelines in August 1996.
A media release from the Minister for the Environment, Senator
Robert Hill, 22/10/96, indicated that an auditor will not be
appointed for at least 2 or 3 weeks, and dropped reference to
parallel auditing. By the time the auditor was "appointed" in
November, most studies of the wildlife had been completed.
How will the community know whether the EIS consultant had
conducted field studies with due diligence ? Who checked that they
didn't turn a blind eye to significant problems when they were out
on the site ? Or that they didn't accidentally miss things due to
the rush to complete their studies ? Nobody !
This is a clear breach of the
recommendations of the Senate Committee, and a clear breach of an election policy promise.
First published June 1998.
Last revised
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